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NOTE
CORPORATE LAW - Consumer's Co-Op v. Olsen, 142 Wis. 2d 465, 419
N.W.2d 211 (1988)
A fundamental rule of corporate law is that corporate shareholders are
not personally responsible for the debts and obligations of the corporation
itself. The concept of "limited liability" is one of the greatest advantages of
the corporate form' and is considered one of the most important legal de-
velopments of the nineteenth century.2
Nevertheless, every rule has its exceptions. Courts are generally in
agreement that abuse of the limited'liability concept justifies piercing the
"corporate veil" to hold the shareholders personally liable. However, the
exact actions or omissions required to pierce the corporate veil are still
quite vague.
In Consumer's Co-Op v. Olsen,4 the Wisconsin Supreme Court found the
level of capitalization at a corporation's inception,' while not independently
sufficient to justify piercing the corporate veil, is significant to a determina-
tion of whether to disregard the corporate entity. The court held that the
corporate creditor had waived its right to assert undercapitalization as a
theory to pierce the veil under the doctrines of waiver and estoppel.6 While
the court acknowledged the need for distinct methods of evaluating con-
1. Hancock, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 3 CORP. COuNS. Q. 110, 111 (1987).
2. Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 371, 371-72 (1981).
As Professor Douglas of Yale referred to the theory in 1929:
Limited liability is now accepted in theory and in practice. It is ingrained in our economic
and legal systems. The social and economic order is arranged accordingly. Our philoso-
phy accepts it. It is legitimate for man or a group of men to stake only a part of their
fortune on enterprise. Legislatures, courts and business usage have made it so.
Douglas & Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193,
193-94 (1929).
3. See Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEx. L. REV. 979 (1971).
4. 142 Wis. 2d 465, 419 N.W.2d 211 (1988).
5. Id. at 486, 419 N.W.2d at 218.
6. Id. at 495, 419 N.W.2d at 222.
In Bostwick-Braun Co. v. Szews, 645 F. Supp. 221 (W.D. Wis. 1986), the district court ex-
plained the new defense to piercing the corporate veil in Wisconsin:
If an individual intentionally relinquishes a known right, either expressly or by conduct
inconsistent with an intent to enforce that right, he has waived it. Estoppel, on the other
hand, focuses on the effects of the conduct of the obligee. It arises when a party's conduct
misleads another into believing that a right will not be enforced and causes the other party
to act to his detriment in reliance upon this belief.
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tract and tort claims, it reiterated the need for a case-by-case analysis to
ensure equitable results, further clouding the issue.7
This Note begins with a brief description of the facts in Consumer's Co-
Op. Next, the development of the corporate entity and limited liability
principles is discussed, followed by an analysis of the court's decision. Fi-
nally, this Note considers the impact of this decision on corporate law and
concludes that Consumer's Co-Op further confuses rather than clarifies the
area, thereby deterring prospective investors and creating excessive
litigation.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ECO of Elkhorn, Inc. ("ECO") was incorporated by Chris Olsen on
January 14, 1980.8 At the first of two formal meetings of the board of direc-
tors, Chris, Jack, and Nancy Olsen were elected President and general man-
ager, treasurer and accountant, and secretary of ECO, respectively.' Soon
after incorporation, ECO began experiencing financial difficulties which re-
sulted in a negative shareholder's equity1" and an inability to satisfy debts
owed to its major creditor, Consumer's Co-Op of Walworth County ("Con-
sumer's").1 ECO filed for reorganization, leaving Consumer's judgment
against ECO unsatisfied. Consumer's initiated a suit against the two major
shareholders, Chris and Jack Olsen, seeking to hold them personally liable
for the debts of the corporation.1 2
The trial court found sufficient evidence to justify the imposition of per-
sonal liability for corporate debts.' 3 Excessive control exercised by the ma-
Id. at 226-27; see also J.H. Cohn & Co. v. American Appraisal Assoc., 628 F.2d 994 (7th Cir.
1980).
7. Consumer's Co-Op, 142 Wis. 2d at 484-85, 419 N.W.2d at 217-18.
8. Consumer's Co-Op v. Olsen, 142 Wis. 2d 465, 470, 419 N.W.2d 211, 212 (1988).
9. Each contributed capital totaling $7,018.25. Id. at 470, 419 N.W.2d at 212.
10. ECO's financial difficulties increased in severity each year as follows:
Negative shareholder's equity
1981 ........... $ 2,723.02
1982 ........... $ 62,815.60
1983 ........... $148,927.92
1984 ........... $189,362.26
Id. at 471, 419 N.W.2d at 212.
11. One of Chris Olsen's personal credit accounts was changed to a corporate account at the
time of ECO's incorporation for the purchase of bulk fuel. Although ECO was not current in
payments beginning in June or July 1983, Consumer's extended credit until March 21, 1984 con-
trary to its credit plan. Id. at 471-72, 419 N.W.2d at 212-13.
12. Id. at 470, 419 N.W.2d at 212.
13. The trial court entered judgment in the amount of $38,851.42. Id.
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jority shareholder, Chris Olsen, and an inadequate level of capitalization 4
were found to be material factors in reaching this decision. The defendants
appealed. 15
Upon certification of the action by the court of appeals, 6 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that the capi-
talization of a corporation must be analyzed at its inception,'7 and that
ECO's capitalization at inception was more than adequate.' 8 The court fur-
ther held that in claims which arise from a contractual relationship, the
doctrines of waiver and estoppel may be more appropriate than precluding
the equitable remedy of piercing the corporate veil.' 9
II. BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Concept of Limited Liability
Although corporate shareholders were not immune from liability for
corporate debts or obligations at common law, shareholder insulation from
such liability has been a cornerstone of corporate law in the United States
14. Later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that the trial court never indicated how and
when ECO's capitalization was analyzed. Id. at 491, 419 N.W.2d at 220. For further discussion,
see infra note 62 and accompanying text.
15. The appellant contended on appeal the following: (1) control is not a factor significant in
a determination of whether to pierce the corporate veil where the corporation under consideration
is operated as a close corporation; (2) undercapitalization is not a factor relevant to a determina-
tion of whether to pierce the corporate veil where the action arises from a contract as opposed to
tortious conduct; and (3) even if a relevant factor, undercapitalization does not constitute a suffi-
cient basis to justify a decision to disregard the corporate entity. Id. at 473, 419 N.W.2d at 213.
16. Wis. STAT. § 809.61 provides as follows:
The supreme court may take jurisdiction of an appeal or other proceeding in the court of
appeals upon certification by the court of appeals or upon the supreme court's own motion.
The supreme court may refuse to take jurisdiction of an appeal or other proceeding certi-
fied to it by the court of appeals.
Id.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction based on two issues of importance which
were certified by the court of appeals. The court of appeals based its certification on (1) the issue
of whether fraud is an essential element which must be proved to pierce the corporate veil, and (2)
whether and under what circumstances, if any, undercapitalization can serve as a basis to pierce
the corporate veil. Consumer's Co-Op, 142 Wis. 2d at 473 n.1, 419 N.W.2d at 213 n.1.
17. 142 Wis. 2d at 486, 419 N.W.2d at 218.
18. Id. at 491, 419 N.W.2d at 220-21. For a discussion of the court's reliance on precedents
to support its holding, see infra note 70 and accompanying text.
19. Id. at 481, 419 N.W.2d at 216.
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since the nineteenth century. 20 The majority of states have enacted statutes
limiting a shareholder's liability21 to the cost of the shares held.22
The American corporation is generally recognized as a legal entity, sep-
arate and distinct from its shareholders23 - a person in the eyes of the
law.24 Albeit fictitious, it enjoys the status of "citizen," with the rights and
privileges and corresponding duties and obligations.2 1 In this vein, the cor-
porate entity alone is deemed wholly responsible for its actions, including
corporate debts.26
Cloaked with its own separate identity, the corporation proved to be an
ideal vehicle to promote important underlying policies during the industri-
alization and development of large business entities.27 However, when in-
voked in support of an end which is subversive of this policy, the courts
may disregard the corporate form.28  This action is often referred to as
20. For an extensive review of the English history of the corporate entity, see BALLANTINE,
BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 118-42 (rev. ed. 1946) and 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 24-28 (rev. perm. ed. 1983).
21. Dodd, The Evolution of Limited Liability in American Industry: Massachusetts, 61
HARV. L. REV. 1351, 1352-53 (1948). For a thorough review of the origins of limited liability, see
Hackney & Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 837 (1982).
22. The early history of limited liability indicates that some states created corporations with
express provisions in their Articles of Incorporation for unlimited shareholder liability. Hackney
& Benson, supra note 21, at 847.
23. Jonas v. State, 19 Wis. 2d 638, 644, 121 N.W.2d 235, 238 (1963). The Wisconsin
Supreme Court adopted this view in Milwaukee Toy Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 203 Wis. 493, 234
N.W. 748 (1931). For a discussion of this decision, see infra note 36 and accompanying text.
More recently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reiterated a similar principle in Sprecher v. Wes-
ton's Bar, Inc., 78 Wis. 2d 26, 253 N.W.2d 493 (1977), which stated:
This court has long taken the position that a corporation is treated as an entity separate
from its shareholders under all ordinary circumstances and thus that contracts entered into
for the corporation by its officers or agents are contracts of the corporation as a distinct
legal entity and neither confer rights nor impose liabilities or restrictions on the sharehold-
ers individually.
Id. at 37, 253 N.W.2d at 498.
24. See Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19 (1930); see also 18 AM. JUR. 2D
Corporations § 63 (1985) (Persons are divided by the law into persons natural and persons artifi-
cial. The term "person" at common law includes both natural and artificial persons, and therefore
as a general rule includes corporations).
25. 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations §§ 63, 64, at 874-75 (1985).
26. Amoco Chemicals Corp. v. Bach, 222 Kan. 589, 567 P.2d 1337 (1977). In Bach, the
court stated, "[w]e start with the basic premise that a corporation and its stockholders are pre-
sumed separate and distinct, whether the corporation has many stockholders or only one. Debts
of the corporation are not the individual indebtedness of stockholders." Id. at 593, 567 P.2d at
1341.
27. Barber, supra note 2, at 372.
28. For an extensive list of cases adopting this policy, see generally 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corpora-
tions § 43 (1985).
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piercing the corporate veil.29 Because the law permits the incorporation of
a business for the very purpose of escaping personal liability, the corporate
entity is not to be regarded lightly.30 Accordingly, "the principle of pierc-
ing the fiction of the corporate entity is to be applied cautiously."3
Although courts32 have attempted to articulate the factors considered in
determining whether to hold shareholders personally liable for corporate
debts, "precise requirements ... rarely have been articulated. '3 3 Courts
have depended upon the premise that "[r]igid rules and fixed formulas are
futile in this area of hazy equities and judicial retrospections" 34 and that
inasmuch as it is essentially equitable in character, the disregard of the cor-
porate entity doctrine will necessarily vary according to the circumstances
of each case.35
B. Milwaukee Toy Co. v. Industrial Commission
The landmark case of Milwaukee Toy Co. v. Industrial Commission36
attempted to develop a general principle to which all courts could refer in
determining the propriety of piercing the corporate veil. Justice Fowler
stated that if "applying the corporate fiction would accomplish some fraud-
ulent purpose, operate as a constructive fraud, or defeat some strong equita-
29. Barber, supra note 2, at 372; C. Krendl & J. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing
the Inquiry, 55 DEN. L.J. 1, 2 (1978); Note, Piercing the Corporate Veil It Can Work in Reverse,
33 MERCER L. REV. 633 (1982).
30. Milwaukee Toy Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 203 Wis. 493, 496, 234 N.W. 748, 749 (1931).
31. 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 43, at 842 (1985).
32. Justice Cardozo was among the many who attempted to clarify this area of the law. Un-
fortunately, his standard for determining when the corporate entity would be disregarded clarified
very little. He stated that "when the sacrifice is essential to the end that some accepted public
policy may be defended or upheld" the corporate entity would be ignored. Berkey v. Third Ave.
Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 95, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
33. Barber, supra note 2, at 373. Professor Hamilton, a leading authority on corporate law,
aptly described the shortcomings of the law when he stated:
This language is inherently unsatisfactory since it merely states the conclusion and gives no
guide to the considerations that lead a court to decide that a particular case should be
considered an exception to the general principle of nonliability. A systematic analysis,
moreover, is not readily discernible in the cases, and many courts continue to rely on
metaphors to explain their results.
Id. at 373-74, n.14 (citation omitted).
34. Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 473, 496 (1953).
35. See, e.g., Swanson v. Levy, 509 F.2d 859, 861-62 (9th Cir. 1975); Stap v. Chicago Aces
Tennis Team, Inc., 63 Ill. App. 3d 23, 28, 379 N.E.2d 1298, 1302 (1978).
36. 203 Wis. 493, 234 N.W. 748 (1931).
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ble claim, the fiction is disregarded"37 and the shareholders are held liable
for the debts incurred by the corporation.
Since 1931, this principle has been reiterated by nearly every court fac-
ing this issue. In determining whether this principle has been upheld,
courts look to any improper use of the corporate form, which is generally
defined as any "failure to conform to a judicially imposed normative model
of corporateness." 3 Additionally, the normative model of "corporateness"
requires that limited liability should only be available to a corporation if a
certain amount of capital investment has actually been made.39 This theory
of undercapitalization 4 was first considered at the turn of the century41 and
is now one of the principle factors used by courts to establish misuse of the
corporate privilege.
C. The Contract versus Tort Distinction
When inadequate capitalization is a factor considered for imposing lia-
bility, most courts make a distinction between contract and tort claim-
ants.42 In contract claims, the courts rarely pierce the corporate veil
4 3
based on the assumption that corporate capitalization is a matter of public
record and, therefore, the creditor knew or had the opportunity to deter-
mine the corporation's financial condition." The contract claimant is con-
37. Id. at 496, 234 N.W. at 749; see also Horticultural Enter. Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 477
F. Supp. 161 (C.D. Cal. 1979). See generally W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRI-
VATE CORPORATIONS § 41.30 (rev. perm. ed. 1983).
38. Hackney & Benson, supra note 21, at 857. Adherence to the stated formulation generally
signifies the existence of a true corporate entity. Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 97 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
39. Hackney & Benson, supra note 21, at 858. The Massachusetts Supreme Court stated in
Hanson v. Bradley, 298 Mass. 371, 10 N.E.2d 259 (1937):
The original purpose of laws permitting the formation of corporations was to enable stock-
holders to put at risk of the business capital reasonably adequate for its needs, and thereby
keep free from that risk their uninvested assets and their personal responsibility. That, as
our corporation laws have long attested, has been deemed consonant with the public inter-
est, and a fair compromise between the desire of investors for the fullest immunity and the
desire of creditors for the fullest means of satisfaction.
Id. at - 10 N.E.2d at 263-64.
40. In Ruppa v. American States Ins. Co., 91 Wis. 2d 628, 284 N.W.2d 318 (1979), the
Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the definition of undercapitalization as found in Anderson v.
Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944), as an "obvious inadequacy of capital measured by the nature and
magnitude of the corporate undertaking." Ruppa, 91 Wis. 2d at 645, 284 N.W.2d at 324 (quoting
Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944)).
41. The earliest known case that relied on the theory of undercapitalization is Oriental Inv.
Co. v. Barclay, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 543, 64 S.W. 80 (Tex. Ct. App. 1901).
42. Hackney & Benson, supra note 21, at 860.
43. Hancock, supra note 1, at 112.
44. Hackney & Benson, supra note 21, at 861-62.
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sidered a "voluntary" creditor45 who will not ordinarily be entitled to assert
undercapitalization as a factor in seeking to hold the shareholders person-
ally liable.46
In tort claims, the courts are relatively more open to piercing the corpo-
rate veil if it appears that to do so will yield a more equitable result.47 Since
a tort claimant has no choice in the selection of his debtor and no opportu-
nity to examine its financial condition, the courts are more inclined to hold
shareholders liable for the torts of their corporations when the element of
inadequate capitalization is present.4" Although inadequate capitalization
is a critical consideration to the denial of limited liability in tort cases,
nearly every tort case in which undercapitalization was stressed and found
was also supported by additional factors constituting an abuse of the corpo-
rate form.4 9 Therefore, the true significance of undercapitalization to the
courts' evaluations is still unknown.
III. AN EVALUATION OF CONSUMER'S CO-OP
In Consumer's Co-Op,50 the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied heavily on
the fundamental premise in its 1931 decision of Milwaukee Toy Co. v. In-
dustrial Commission51 that "[b]y legal fiction the corporation is a separate
entity and is treated as such under all ordinary circumstances."52 Above
all, the court emphasized the subliminal theme of Milwaukee Toy that the
legal entity is not to be lightly disregarded. 3
To illustrate under what circumstances the Milwaukee Toy principle
would be abandoned, the court took notice of two recent Wisconsin
Supreme Court cases, Wiebke v. Richardson & Sons, Inc.54 and Sprecher v.
45. However, not all creditors have the same opportunity to investigate the corporation's
financial background. Where a transaction is small or the creditor lacks bargaining power to
obtain financial data, etc., the contract creditor should not be considered a voluntary creditor. Id.
at 863.
46. Most courts, however, hold that contract creditors may still pierce the veil if a corpora-
tion has misrepresented its financial responsibility to the creditor. In Edwards Co. v. Monogram
Indus. Inc., 730 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1984), the Fifth Circuit stated, "in order to pierce the corpo-
rate veil on a contract claim in Texas, a showing of fraud or injustice is required .. " Id. at 979;
see also Hancock, supra note 1, at 112.
47. Hancock, supra note 1, at 113.
48. Abraham v. Lake Forest, Inc., 377 So. 2d 465 (La. Ct. App. 1979). See generally Ca-
taldo, supra note 34, at 475-78.
49. Hackney & Benson, supra note 21, at 869.
50. 142 Wis. 2d 465, 419 N.W.2d 211 (1988).
51. 203 Wis. 493, 234 N.W. 748 (1931).
52. Consumer's Co-Op, 142 Wis. 2d at 474, 419 N.W.2d at 213.
53. Id. at 475, 419 N.W.2d at 214.
54. 83 Wis. 2d 359, 265 N.W.2d 571 (1978).
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Weston's Bar, Inc.55 Both reaffirmed this principle, but nevertheless disre-
garded the corporate entity. In Sprecher, the defendants disregarded corpo-
rate formalities56 and took out in salary most of the corporate profits. In
Wiebke, the defendant treated the corporate checking account as his per-
sonal account and, although he did not take wages, he did withdraw funds
without making additions to capital.1
7
In the determination of whether to disregard the corporate form, both
holdings stated generally that the disregard of corporate formalities alone is
insufficient.58 The corporate form must also be "used to evade an obliga-
tion, to gain an unjust advantage or to commit an injustice."59
In attempting to explain the vagueness of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's standard, Justice Ceci in Consumer's Co-Op frequently made refer-
ence to the need for flexibility and a case-by-case analysis in making the
determination of whether to disregard the corporate entity.60 The court
reiterated the reasoning of a previous court which stated that all possible
factors must be considered in determining whether to pierce the corporate
veil.61
A. The Relationship of Undercapitalization to Piercing the Corporate Veil
The court reaffirmed its position in Consumer's Co-Op that under-
capitalization, while not "independently sufficient ground[s] to pierce the
corporate veil," is a significant consideration. 62 A firm stance was taken as
to the point in time the corporation's capitalization is to be analyzed. In
rejecting the respondent's contention that there is a continuing requirement
to maintain an adequate level of capitalization, the court relied on Gelatt v.
55. 78 Wis. 2d 26, 253 N.W.2d 493 (1977).
56. The Consumer's Co-Op court noted that in Sprecher, "the individual defendants made no
serious attempt to hold corporate meetings or to maintain records of corporate meetings and that
[the corporation] had no substantial assets .. " 142 Wis. 2d at 475, 419 N.W.2d at 214 (quoting
Sprecher, 78 Wis. 2d at 38-39, 253 N.W.2d at 498).
57. Weibke, 83 Wis. 2d at 364, 265 N.W.2d at 574.
58. Consumer's Co-Op, 142 Wis. 2d at 476, 419 N.W.2d at 214.
59. Wiebke, 83 Wis. 2d at 363, 265 N.W.2d at 573.
60. Consumer's Co-Op, 142 Wis. 2d at 485-86, 419 N.W.2d at 218.
61. The court recognized:
It is not the presence or absence of any particular factor that is determinative. Rather, it is
a combination of factors which, when taken together with an element of injustice or abuse
of corporate privilege, suggest that the corporate entity attacked was ... the "mere instru-
mentality or tool of the shareholder."
142 Wis. 2d at 485-86, 419 N.W.2d at 218 (quoting Glenn v. Wagner, 313 N.C. 450, 458, 329
S.E.2d 326, 332 (1985)).
62. Consumer's Co-Op, 142 Wis. 2d at 482, 419 N.W.2d at 217.
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DeDakis,63 which implicitly rejected that argument and stated that the ade-
quacy of capital is to be measured as of the time of corporate formation. 64
Therefore, once shareholders have adequately capitalized the corporation,
there is no requirement that they provide for losses beyond the amount of
their original subscription in the corporation.65
In determining what constitutes sufficient capitalization, Justice Ceci re-
affirmed the standard set in Ruppa v. American States Insurance Co.66 The
Ruppa court "emphasize[d] economic viability rather than an inflexible
computation of minimal capitalization: a corporation is undercapitalized
when there is an obvious inadequacy of capital, 'measured by the nature
and magnitude of the corporate undertaking.' "67 Thus, in Consumer's Co-
Op, the appellant corporation was found to be more than sufficiently capi-
talized in relation to the "slight size" of its initial undertaking.68
B. Piercing the Corporate Veil as an Equitable Remedy
The court rejected the appellant's argument that, due to the status of the
respondent as a voluntary creditor, it is barred from asserting undercapital-
ization as a factor in determining whether to disregard the corporate en-
tity.69 The court agreed with the reasoning in a United States Court of
Appeals case7° that inadequate capital may be a factor relevant to whether
"an injustice is present sufficient to justify piercing the corporate veil in a
contract case.'
The Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged that the "volitional na-
ture" of contract cases necessitates that a distinction be made between con-
tract and tort cases.72 However, it concluded that application of the
63. 77 Wis. 2d 578, 254 N.W.2d 171 (1977).
64. Consumer's Co-Op, 142 Wis. 2d at 486, 419 N.W.2d at 218 (citing W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 44.1 (rev. perm. ed. 1983)).
65. Id. at 487, 419 N.W.2d at 219. However, in cases where the corporation has distinctly
changed the nature and magnitude of its business, the court will inquire as to the level of capital at
the time of its change as well as at its inception. Id.
66. 91 Wis. 2d 628, 284 N.W.2d 318 (1979).
67. Consumer's Co-Op, 142 Wis. 2d at 488, 419 N.W.2d at 218-19 (quoting Am. States Ins.
Co., 91 Wis. 2d 628, 645, 284 N.W.2d 318, 324 (1979).
68. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
69. Consumer's Co-Op, 142 Wis. 2d at 480, 419 N.W.2d at 216.
70. Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The Labadie court quoted the
opinion of another commentator who noted, "[i]f the prior opportunity to investigate is a consid-
eration, then the plaintiff's lack of sophistication is equally tenable against the presumption that
they knowingly assumed the risk of the corporation's undercapitalization." Id. at 100 (quoting
Barber, supra note 2, at 386).
71. Consumer's Co-Op, 142 Wis. 2d at 481, 419 N.W.2d at 216.
72. Id.
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equitable remedy of piercing the corporate veil is inappropriate in contract
cases. Instead, the doctrines of estoppel and waiver are more suitable.73
These doctrines are not to be systematically applied in all contract cases.
Rather, a case-by-case analysis should be used to maintain flexibility and
assure equitable results in all cases.
The court found the doctrines of waiver and estoppel applicable consid-
ering two key facts in this case: The fact that Consumer's did not investi-
gate the capital structure of ECO before extending credit, and the fact that
after ECO failed to make regular payments, Consumer's continued to ex-
tend credit even after ECO failed to make regular payments.74 Since the
court had already found the appellant's initial capitalization adequate, the
respondent was precluded from asserting any claim as to subsequent under-
capitalization as a factor to justify disregard of the corporate entity.75
IV. ANALYSIS
In Consumer's Co-Op v. Olsen,7 6 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, by
certifying two issues of importance to the determination of whether to
pierce the corporate veil,77 recognized the need for further clarification by
the state's highest court. Consumer's Co-Op illustrates a futile attempt by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court to elaborate on the issues as requested by the
lower court.
In Consumer's Co-Op, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that fraud
was not required to pierce the corporate veil;78 that undercapitalization at a
corporation's inception was an important element in the determination of
whether limited liability is deserved; 79 and that the doctrines of waiver and
estoppel were more appropriate than applying the remedy of piercing the
corporate veil in contract cases.8°
This case clarified the point at which undercapitalization is used as the
primary factor justifying the disregard of the corporate entity. Based on
this decision, subsequent undercapitalization is not a factor to be used to
disregard the corporate entity.8" Therefore, other factors must exist before
73. Id. (footnote omitted).
74. Id. at 494, 419 N.W.2d at 222.
75. Id. at 497, 419 N.W.2d at 223.
76. 142 Wis. 2d 465, 419 N.W.2d 211 (1988).
77. Id. at 473 n.1, 419 N.W.2d at 213 n.1. For further discussion of the issues certified, see
supra note 16 and accompanying text.
78. 142 Wis. 2d at 480, 419 N.W.2d at 216.
79. Id. at 486, 419 N.W.2d at 218.
80. Id. at 481, 419 N.W.2d at 216; see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
81. Id. at 497, 419 N.W.2d at 223; see supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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the corporate veil will be pierced. Unfortunately, the court failed to go one
step further and identify the circumstances which justify piercing it.
A. Undercapitalization as a Standard for Piercing the Corporate Veil
Most courts fail to explain their rationale as to what constitutes ade-
quate corporate capitalization.82 The Consumer's Co-Op court did firmly
state that sufficiency of capital was to be analyzed at the corporation's in-
ception. 3 The court also acknowledged the contribution that the capitali-
zation factor makes to the evaluation process, but it made no attempt to
explain exactly how the adequacy of a corporation's capital is measured.
The court again relied on precedent to provide us with a useless, overly-
broad standard from which capitalization is to be measured. The court reit-
erated the standard for undercapitalization - when there is an "obvious
inadequacy of capital 'measured by the nature and magnitude of the corpo-
rate undertaking.' "84 This standard, while extremely flexible, gives little
guidance to those attempting to assure themselves that this issue would not
be decided against them if challenged. As a result, since the court, once
again, did not divulge the specific factors to be considered in analyzing the
capital undertaking, our understanding of what constitutes a sufficient level
of capitalization is still uncertain.
B. Necessity for Establishing Guidelines to Pierce the Corporate Veil
Firmly established guidelines are essential to the continued economic
prosperity which has resulted from the creation of the corporate entity.
This unique principle allows the average person to make capital contribu-
tions in even high-risk ventures without fearing personal liability for the
fate of the endeavor. While courts continue to stress the importance of
respecting the corporate entity and protecting the shareholders, the lack of
firmly established guidelines may turn this general rule into an exception.
This lack of guidance creates two problems. First, it generates excessive
litigation. Second, arbitrary holdings by different courts act as a deterrent
to prospective investors who fear the ever-increasing chance of a lawsuit
brought for any number of reasons.
While shareholders should understand the corporate law as it pertains
to required and forbidden actions of corporate shareholders, additional
"rules of the game" implemented by the court system could only clarify the
law and promote adherence. The result: shareholders will be on notice of
82. Barber, supra note 2, at 394.
83. Consumer's Co-Op, 142 Wis. 2d at 486, 419 N.W.2d at 218.
84. Id. at 488, 419 N.W.2d at 219; see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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exactly what actions are construed as improper in the eyes of the law,
thereby ridding our justice system of unnecessary litigation.
The main purpose behind the general rule of limited shareholder liabil-
ity is to promote investment and stimulate economic growth. While it is
understood that abuse of this privilege justifies exceptions, care must be
taken to ensure the exceptions do not swallow the rule or act to defeat its
purpose. The seemingly unrelated exceptions formulated by courts serve to
diminish the appeal of capital investments. Shareholders realize that the
lack of uniformity leaves them defenseless against any given court's inter-
pretation of what it feels a corporation should be and how it should be
operated. Eventually, the very purpose for which limited liability was im-
plemented will be negated, resulting in certain economic decline.
V. CONCLUSION
The court's holding, while providing a standard as to when a corpora-
tion's capitalization is to be analyzed, failed to address critical questions
arising from this decision. The court's failure to take the opportunity to
clarify this area of the law will necessarily lead to further litigation and
depressed capital investments until established standards are set by future
courts.
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